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INTRODUCTION
The Innocence Project estimates that at least 20,000 men and
1
women are currently incarcerated for crimes they did not commit.
The combination of scientific progress and the zealous advocacy of
attorneys has helped begin to remedy this injustice: to date, 273 men
and women have been exonerated through post-conviction DNA
2
testing.
Notwithstanding these exonerations, inmates still face great
3
difficulties gaining access to untested DNA evidence. Today, the two
options inmates may use to obtain DNA evidence at the federal level
4
are a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or a civil
5
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States
Supreme Court has attempted to carve out distinctions between these
6
options so that § 1983 is not used when habeas is more appropriate.
Those distinctions, however, produced a circuit split regarding
whether § 1983 requests for post-conviction DNA evidence should
7
8
succeed. The Court’s recent decision in Skinner v. Switzer, resolved
1. See INNOCENCE PROJECT, 200 EXONERATED, TOO MANY WRONGFULLY CONVICTED
43 n.1, http://www.innocenceproject.org/200/ip_200.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2011)
(explaining how current research by several professors was used to reach the
estimated number of innocent men and women behind bars).
2. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
know/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2011) (reviewing the Innocence Project’s case profiles
and providing statistics regarding exonerations since the advent of DNA testing).
3. See David A. Schumacher, Comment, Post-Conviction Access to DNA Testing: The
Federal Government Does Not Offer an Adequate Solution, Leaving the States to Remedy the
Situation, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2008) (referring to the quest for DNA
evidence as “an almost insurmountable uphill climb”). As one example of how
difficult this can be, “the State of Virginia only recently removed a rule that granted
defendants a time period of merely twenty-one days after sentencing is finalized to
present new evidence.” See Jason Borenstein, DNA in the Legal System: The Benefits Are
Clear, The Problems Aren’t Always, 3 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 847, 860 n.91
(2006).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) (allowing prisoners to challenge their convictions
under the Constitution based on a misapplication of the facts).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing a remedy in federal court when state
courts fail to adequately protect federal rights).
6. See Note, Defining the Reach of Heck v. Humphrey: Should the Favorable
Termination Rule Apply to Individuals Who Lack Access to Habeas Corpus?, 121 HARV. L.
REV. 868, 868–69 (2008) (discussing how the Supreme Court has dealt with the
overlapping nature of the two legal remedies over time).
7. Compare McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 102 (2d Cir. 2007) (concluding that
a prisoner’s § 1983 claim is proper even if success on the claim might indicate a
wrongful conviction), and Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 672 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding
a post-conviction DNA § 1983 claim did not necessarily imply the invalidity of the
prisoner’s sentence although success might afford the prisoner an opportunity to use

CARRERA.OFF.TO.PRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

3/26/2012 8:14 PM

SECTION 1983 & THE AGE OF INNOCENCE

433

the split and held that § 1983 requests for post-conviction DNA
9
testing are proper.
Part I of this Note discusses post-conviction access to DNA
evidence, describes the facts and procedural history of Skinner, and
examines the Court’s decision and dissent in Skinner. Specifically,
Part I focuses on the Court’s restriction of the issue to § 1983 and the
concerns of dissenting Justice Thomas that these claims are only
appropriate in habeas corpus claims. Part II argues that allowing §
1983 access would not have been necessary if the Court recognized a
freestanding actual innocence claim. Finally, this Note analyzes how
current restrictions to federal habeas corpus render a prisoner’s
ability to seek post-conviction DNA evidence unworkable and argues
that § 1983 access was a necessary procedural loophole to remedy
those restrictions.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. Overview of Post-Conviction Access to DNA Evidence Through Federal
Habeas Corpus and § 1983
Today, convicted prisoners seeking post-conviction access to DNA
evidence may pursue relief through two avenues. The first option is
to use the narrow federal habeas corpus statute, which permits
10
prisoners to challenge their detention after being convicted. The
other option is § 1983, a broad federal statute that provides a remedy
for individuals alleging a variety of constitutional and federal civil
11
rights violations by persons acting under color of state law. Because
the results of the DNA testing in a future proceeding), and Bradley v. Pryor, 305 F.3d
1287, 1290–91 (11th Cir. 2002) (allowing a § 1983 claim for post-conviction DNA
testing because granting a prisoner access to DNA evidence does not necessarily
imply the invalidity of his sentence), with Kutzner v. Montgomery Cnty., 303 F.3d
339, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (rejecting a § 1983 claim for postconviction DNA evidence access because the evidence is entwined with the factual
findings underlying the conviction), abrogated by Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289
(2011), and Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 378 (4th Cir. 2002) (denying a prisoner’s
§ 1983 claim because he was using it as a discovery device to overturn his state
conviction), abrogated by Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
8. 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011).
9. Id. at 1298–99.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006); Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973)
(presenting a historical context of habeas corpus as a means of securing freedom
from a purportedly illegal incarceration).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (providing that any person acting under the color
of law who deprives a U.S. citizen or any person within the U.S. of any right or
privilege under the Constitution or its laws shall be held liable); Ian D. Forsythe, A
Guide to Civil Rights Liability Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: An Overview of Supreme Court and
Eleventh Circuit Precedent, CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, http://www.constitution.org/brief/
forsythe_42-1983.htm (last visited Oct. 26, 2011) (outlining the history, elements,
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§ 1983 is civil in nature, it allows prisoners to request different types
12
of relief, including injunctions, damages, and declaratory relief.
Unlike in habeas claims, prisoners generally are not required to
13
exhaust state remedies under § 1983. Additionally, § 1983 claims
are not subject to the strict time limitations and rules against
14
successive filings that characterize the federal habeas statute.
The two statutes overlap when a criminal convicted in state court
challenges the constitutionality of his conviction or sentence in
federal court because both statutes provide constitutional remedies
15
for constitutional violations. The Court attempted to clarify this
16
apparent overlap in Heck v. Humphrey, holding that convicted
prisoners could not properly proceed under § 1983 if the defendant
requested relief that would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his
conviction or sentence.” Such a request, the Court explained,
17
required a habeas analysis. However, within the context of DNA
evidence, § 1983 access may or may not “necessarily impl[y]” the
18
invalidity of the prisoner’s criminal conviction. That question was
left open until the Court granted certiorari in Skinner v. Switzer.
B. Skinner v. Switzer: Facts and Procedural History
On New Year’s Eve 1993, Henry “Hank” Skinner ingested codeine
pills and large amounts of alcohol instead of preparing to attend a
19
party with his then-girlfriend Twila Busby.
When their friend,
Howard Mitchell, arrived at Skinner’s home at 10:15 p.m., he tried to
wake Skinner, but Skinner was “kind of comatose,” unconscious on
20
the couch, and unresponsive to shouting or shaking. After waiting
for fifteen minutes, Mitchell and Busby left for the party without
and defenses pertaining to § 1983 claims).
12. Benjamin Vetter, Comment, Habeas, Section 1983, and Post-Conviction Access to
DNA Evidence, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 587, 587–90 (2004) (explaining that a successful
habeas suit would secure release from prison while a § 1983 claim would not).
13. Eric Despotes, Comment, The Evidentiary Watershed: Recognizing a PostConviction Constitutional Right to Access DNA Evidence Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 49 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 821, 824–25 (2009) (explaining the ways § 1983 claims are less
restrictive than habeas petitions).
14. Id. at 825–26.
15. See Note, supra note 6, at 868 (explaining that the overlap between the two
statutes led to the Supreme Court having to decide whether they were
interchangeable when a state prisoner challenges his conviction or confinement).
16. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
17. Id. at 487.
18. See cases cited supra note 7 (showing the various decisions after Heck
regarding whether post-conviction access to DNA evidence “necessarily implies” the
invalidity of a prisoner’s conviction).
19. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7–8, Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289
(2011) (No. 09-9000).
20. Id. at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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21

him. During the party, Robert Donnell, Busby’s uncle, drunkenly
22
Busby asked
stalked and made crude sexual remarks to Busby.
Mitchell to take her home, and when Mitchell returned to the party
23
Donnell was no longer there. Twila Busby and her two sons were
24
later found brutally murdered.
At Skinner’s trial, the prosecution did not consider strong evidence
25
that indicated Donnell was the real murderer. A toxicologist gave
expert testimony that Skinner was too impaired by the alcohol and
codeine in his system to have had the strength to commit the
26
murder. Furthermore, a large quantity of DNA evidence that could
27
have conclusively identified the true killer remained untested.
Despite an alternative suspect, evidence that Skinner likely did not
possess the strength or coordination to commit the murders, and an
abundance of untested DNA evidence, a jury convicted Skinner of
28
capital murder and sentenced him to death.
Beginning in 2000, Skinner requested that the district attorney
grant him access to the untested DNA evidence; these requests were
29
repeatedly denied.
Skinner also sought access to the evidence
under Texas’s post-conviction DNA statute and by filing state and
30
federal writs for habeas corpus, but he was again denied. Finally,
Skinner sought post-conviction access to DNA testing using one of

21. Id. at 8–9.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 7–8.
25. See id. at 11 (discussing Donnell’s violent past behavior and his inappropriate
conduct on the night of the murder).
26. See id. at 10 (providing that an expert at trial opined that Skinner was “at best
in a ‘stuporous’ condition” at the time of the murders, “such that it would have
required all of his physical and mental agility just to stand,” and thus was not
physically able to execute the murders).
27. Id. at 12–13 (identifying seven items that Skinner asked to be tested: vaginal
swabs taken from Busby at the time of her autopsy; Busby’s fingernail clippings; a
knife found on the front porch of Busby’s house; a knife found in a plastic bag in the
living room of the same house; a dishtowel found in the same plastic bag; a
windbreaker jacket found in the living room next to Busby’s body; and any hairs
found on Busby’s hands that had not been destroyed by previous testing).
28. Id. at 5.
29. Id.
30. See Skinner v. Quarterman, No. 2:99-CV-0045, 2007 WL 582808, at *1 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 22, 2007) (denying petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court),
aff’d, 576 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 2009); Skinner v. State, 122 S.W.3d 808, 811 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003) (denying attempts to gain access via state post-conviction procedures),
aff’d, 293 S.W.3d 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); Ex parte Skinner, No. 20,203-04 (Tex.
Crim.
App.
Oct.
10,
2001)
(unpublished),
available
at
http://www.cca.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/EventInfo.asp?EventID=1982389
(dismissing state habeas corpus claim because of pending federal habeas corpus
claim).
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31

the last existing means available—§ 1983. Nonetheless, Skinner was
32
denied relief and faced an impending execution.
The Supreme Court granted Skinner a stay less than an hour
33
before he was scheduled to be executed.
The Court granted
34
certiorari and heard oral arguments in his case on October 13, 2010.
The issue before the Court was whether a convicted prisoner seeking
access to biological evidence for DNA testing may assert that claim in
a civil rights action under § 1983, or whether such a claim may be
35
asserted only in a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
C. Skinner v. Switzer: The Supreme Court’s Decision and Justice
Thomas’s Dissent
In Skinner, the Court measured Skinner’s claim against its prior
holding in Heck v. Humphrey that § 1983 claims are not proper if “a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the
36
invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” In finding that Skinner’s
request for DNA would not “necessarily imply” the invalidity of his
conviction, the Court emphasized that the test results might
37
implicate, rather than exculpate, Skinner.
The respondent had
argued that Skinner’s ultimate aim in requesting DNA testing was to
38
attack his conviction. The Court responded that there was no case
in which it recognized habeas as the sole remedy “where the relief
sought would ‘neither terminat[e] custody, accelerat[e] the future
39
date of release from custody, nor reduc[e] the level of custody.’”
Respondent and its amici expressed concerns about the expansion
of federal jurisdiction; specifically, they predicted a surge of federal
40
civil actions. The Court, however, noted that these concerns were
unwarranted for the following reasons: (1) the circuits that currently
allow § 1983 claims for DNA testing have not shown any “flood or

31. Skinner v. Switzer, 364 F. App’x 113, 113 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citing
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006)).
32. Id. at 114; cf. Kutzner v. Montgomery Cnty., 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a § 1983 action was not the proper avenue to bring a post-conviction
claim for DNA).
33. Lyle Denniston, Execution Delayed in DNA Case, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 24, 2010,
6:17 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/03/execution-delayed-in-dna-case-2/.
34. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1289, 1293 (2011).
35. Id. at 1293.
36. Id. at 1298 (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
37. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Id. at 1299 (citing Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 86 (2005) (Scalia, J.,
concurring)).
39. Id. (quoting Dotson, 544 U.S. at 86 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
40. Id.
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41

even rainfall” of litigation; (2) the Court’s recent decision in District
42
Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, where it rejected a substantive due process
basis for these types of claims, makes the toll on federal courts even
43
more unlikely; and (3) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of
44
1995, Congress limited prisoner suits to “prevent sportive filings in
45
federal court.”
In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that allowing § 1983
challenges like Skinner’s would undermine Congress’s strict
limitation on federal review of state habeas decisions and contended
46
that Skinner’s claims should only be brought in habeas corpus.
Because collateral review procedures permit challenges to a
conviction only after the conviction is final, Justice Thomas argued,
47
procedural challenges “concern[] the validity of a conviction.”
Furthermore, Justice Thomas emphasized that Congress has limited
federal habeas challenges to state convictions and state habeas
decisions because of concerns for federal-state comity, and he labeled
48
§ 1983 claims as undercutting those restrictions. As a result, Justice
Thomas proclaimed that the Court’s decision facilitates additional §
1983 claims related to the state habeas process and allows for another
49
“bite at the apple” after unsuccessful habeas claims.
II. ANALYSIS
Section 1983 access would not have been necessary if the Court
had recognized a freestanding actual innocence claim. Further,
because the Court only decided the narrower issue, § 1983 access was
necessary in the post-conviction DNA context due to the combination
of current federal habeas restrictions. Barring § 1983 claims would
leave prisoners with valid constitutional claims unable to access
evidence that could conclusively establish their guilt or innocence.

41. Id.
42. 129 S. Ct. 2308 (2009).
43. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299; see Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2321 (rejecting the
extension of substantive due process to the post-conviction context and, therefore,
leaving little room for a prisoner to show that the governing state law denies him due
process).
44. Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321–66 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 11, 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
45. Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1299.
46. Id. at 1302 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 1303.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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A. Section 1983 Access Would Not Have Been Necessary if the Court Had
Recognized a Freestanding Actual Innocence Claim
In the future, the Court could provide a viable path for postconviction DNA testing in federal habeas corpus claims by
recognizing a freestanding actual innocence claim. In Herrera v.
50
Collins, the Supreme Court held that simply alleging a defendant is
“actual[ly] innocen[t]” does not, by itself, make a cognizable
51
constitutional claim. Although the Court said a “truly persuasive
demonstration of ‘actual innocence’” could make a sufficient
constitutional claim, it did not elaborate on what would be “truly
52
persuasive.”
By placing an extraordinarily lofty burden on a
hypothetically achievable freestanding claim of innocence, the Court
53
has rendered habeas relief a mere mysticism.
Since Herrera, the Court has been unwilling to clarify its stance,
making federal habeas actions based on actual innocence claims
54
55
problematic. In 2006, the Court’s decision in House v. Bell again
assumed that a federal constitutional right to relief based on a
56
showing of actual innocence exists. But the Court suggested that to
prevail on a claim of actual innocence, a prisoner would have to meet
57
a substantially high bar.
In Osborne, the Court held that the
58
freestanding actual innocence issue was still an “open question.”
Importantly, the Court noted that if a freestanding actual innocence
59
claim did exist, it would be brought in habeas.
The Court
elaborated that if such a claim were subsequently found “viable,” then
“federal procedural rules [would] permit discovery ‘for good
60
cause.’” Two months later, the Court ordered a hearing in the case
of a Georgia death row inmate, Troy Davis, on the issue of “actual
innocence,” stating that it would violate the Eighth Amendment
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment to execute an innocent
50. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
51. Id. at 404 (internal quotation marks omitted).
52. Id. at 417.
53. See Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2919, 2950
(2010) (“For seventeen years since Herrera was decided in 1993, the federal courts
have operated under what Justice Scalia called ‘a strange regime’ assuming that an
actual innocence claim exists, but unsure of its status or context.”).
54. See, e.g., House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 555 (2006) (holding that although a
prisoner had “cast doubt” on his conviction, he failed to meet the “extraordinarily
high” burden of a freestanding innocence claim implied in Herrera).
55. 547 U.S. 518 (2006).
56. Id. at 522.
57. Id.
58. Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2321–22 (2009).
59. Id. at 2322.
60. Id. (citations omitted).
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61

Skinner afforded the Court an
man, as Davis claimed to be.
opportunity to clarify this ambiguous stance on claims of actual
innocence; however, the Court chose to restrict its decision to the
62
narrow § 1983 issue.
By failing to resolve Herrera and its progeny and adopt a
constitutional innocence claim in light of modern DNA testing’s
ability to prove innocence, the Supreme Court again demonstrated
its reluctance to fully respond to scientific progress and blocked relief
63
for prisoners trying to seek habeas relief. The Court’s underlying
rationale in Herrera focused on concepts of finality and reliability that
64
are no longer valid because of DNA’s probative value. Herrera was
decided only four years after DNA evidence became available and
when states were divided on how to deal with new evidence of
65
innocence.
Forty-eight states have since enacted post-conviction
statutes to provide relief to prisoners seeking access to DNA
66
evidence. Furthermore, DNA evidence today lasts for decades and
can prove guilt or innocence more accurately than any of the
traditional evidence underlying the Court’s previous reliability
67
concerns.
Because finality concerns no longer exist in the post-conviction
DNA context, the Court could have ensured uniformity by
68
establishing a freestanding innocence claim in Skinner. However,
the Court chose only to decide the narrower issue and rightly held
that prisoners may seek access to post-conviction DNA testing under §
69
1983. By doing so, the Court continued to duck the larger issue and
61. In re Davis, 130 S. Ct. 1, 1 (2009) (mem.).
62. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) (explaining that the Court
was only deciding whether there was federal court subject matter jurisdiction over
Skinner’s complaint and whether his § 1983 claims were proper).
63. See Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1700
(2008) (opining that if the Court had established a freestanding innocence claim in
House and reconsidered Herrera, “it might have concluded that the advent of DNA
testing upended the two pillars supporting the decision: reliability and finality”).
64. See id. at 1701 (arguing that the weak evidence of innocence in Herrera led
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, despite their support of a freestanding innocence
claim, to join the majority opinion).
65. Id. at 1702.
66. Reforms by State, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
news/LawView2.php (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
67. See Garrett, supra note 63, at 1703 (citing Christopher H. Asplen, Integrating
DNA Technology into the Criminal Justice System, 83 JUDICATURE 144, 146 (1999))
(describing the difference between modern DNA evidence and earlier tests’ ability to
establish guilt or innocence).
68. See id. at 1717 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s conflicted reaction to
modern advancements in DNA testing would be solved if it adopted a constitutional
innocence claim).
69. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1297 (2011) (holding that Skinner’s
other challenges were not ripe for consideration).
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effectively rendered the existence of freestanding actual innocence
claims in federal habeas corpus “as little more than false beacons of
hope: claims that can be raised and argued but never, as a practical
70
reality, won.”
B. The Court Created a Necessary Procedural Loophole by Allowing
§ 1983 Claims for Post-Conviction DNA Access Due to the Current Federal
Habeas Corpus Restrictions
In 1963, Professor Paul Bator wrote a famous law review article
about the scope of federal habeas corpus, and his argument became
71
known as Bator’s Process View. Bator’s Process View argues that the
possibility the last court to hear a case could make a mistake always
72
exists no matter how many times a prior judgment is reviewed. The
Process View’s standard is to create a procedural model that provides
73
“a reasoned and acceptable probability that justice will be done.” In
applying this standard to habeas corpus, Bator’s theory would ask:
did the measures and processes of the state court, which previously
determined the facts and applied the law, give the prisoner a full and
74
fair opportunity to litigate his claims? According to Bator, if the
prisoner was given an adequate opportunity to litigate any federal
claims in state court, then the federal courts should defer to previous
75
state judgments.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA) builds on Bator’s Process View and presents significant
procedural obstacles that hamper potential federal habeas corpus
76
relief. Specifically, the AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and
70. Kathleen Callahan, Note, In Limbo: In re Davis and the Future of Herrera
Innocence Claims in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 629, 636 (2011).
71. See generally Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus
for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963) (arguing that federal questions in state
criminal trials should only be revisited by federal courts when challenging the state’s
decisional process rather than the decision itself).
72. See id. at 446–48 (explaining the problem of finality and presenting the
underlying premise that because no tribunal is infallible, no certainty of guilt exists
for any detention); see also Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (“We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only
because we are final.”).
73. Bator, supra note 71, at 448; cf. Louis L. Jaffe, Judicial Review: Question of Law,
69 HARV. L. REV. 239, 244 (1955) (“The question then is not whether the fact exists in
an absolute sense but whether the evidence is adequate to justify the exercise of
power: ultimately, whether the evidence is a sufficient moral predicate in the sense
that society will accept it as sufficient for the exercise of the power in question.”).
74. Bator, supra note 71, at 449.
75. Id. at 462.
76. See CARY FEDERMAN, THE BODY AND THE STATE: HABEAS CORPUS AND AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 35, 162 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 2006) (explaining that the AEDPA’s
habeas limitations and federal deference to state court fact finding are very difficult
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restrictions on a prisoner’s ability to file second or successive
petitions with a new, previously unasserted claim prevents federal
courts from considering new evidence of innocence in postconviction DNA access cases because untested DNA evidence usually
77
surfaces years after trial. Thus, pursuing federal habeas claims is a
difficult road for prisoners, like Skinner, to travel when trying to
access DNA evidence post-conviction because newly discovered
evidence claims do not state a ground for habeas relief absent an
independent constitutional violation occurring in the underlying
78
state criminal proceeding.
Despite the aforementioned restrictions on a prisoner’s ability to
seek post-conviction DNA testing in a federal habeas petition, Justice
Thomas still contends that this type of challenge may not be brought
79
under § 1983. Contrary to Justice Thomas’s argument, however,
Skinner is not attempting to circumvent habeas: he has already
80
failed. Further, the AEDPA substantially limits the ability of federal
81
courts to hear new evidence of innocence. As a result, the current
restrictions on federal habeas corpus coupled with a bar on § 1983
claims would leave prisoners with valid constitutional claims unable
to access evidence that could conclusively establish their guilt or
82
innocence.
In the event that DNA testing provides a favorable result after
receiving access to the evidence, a federal habeas petition would not
necessarily follow, particularly given the current state of freestanding
to get around); Thomas P. Crocker, Envisioning the Constitution, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1,
44 (2007) (“AEDPA has the effect of limiting the habeas claims a federal court may
review, effectively eliminating many habeas petitions at the district court level, and
even more, by narrowly restraining the limitation period during which a habeas
petition may be filed, effectively reducing the number of claims any federal court
hears.” (footnotes omitted)). But see ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING
THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY 153 (2001) (arguing that the final version of the AEDPA
enacted modest reforms relative to the proposals that came before it).
77. Garrett, supra note 63, at 1689.
78. See Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963) (noting that newly discovered
evidence relevant to the guilt of a state prisoner is not, by itself, a ground for relief
on federal habeas corpus); Susan Bandes, Simple Murder: A Comment on the Legality of
Executing the Innocent, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 516–18 (1996) (arguing for consideration
of newly-discovered evidence in federal court).
79. Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
80. See Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 35–36,
Skinner v. Switzer, No. 2:09-CV-0281, 2010 WL 273143 (N.D. Tex. 2010), 2009 WL
5143302 at *35–36 (distinguishing Skinner’s case from Osborne by showing that
Skinner, unlike Osborne, has already twice attempted to seek testing through state
procedures rather than going straight to § 1983).
81. See Garrett, supra note 63, at 1688–89 (describing the provision restricting
claims for new evidence of innocence under the AEDPA).
82. See id. at 1690 (noting that habeas corpus claims for a new evidentiary
hearing for untested DNA evidence are highly unlikely).
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On the contrary, subsequent to
claims of actual innocence.
favorable DNA test results, a prisoner would be more likely to
proceed through clemency, seek prosecutorial consent to vacate, or
84
pursue other established mechanisms for post-conviction relief.
Therefore, the Court’s decision allowing Skinner to bring his claim
under § 1983 does not undermine the current limitations Congress
85
has placed on federal habeas. Instead, Skinner provides a necessary
opportunity for a prisoner to seek DNA testing that could
conclusively prove innocence or guilt without expanding those
restrictions.
CONCLUSION
The Skinner decision, on its face, appears to be a positive
development for prisoners seeking DNA evidence and testing that
can conclusively prove their guilt or innocence. This Note has
shown, however, that allowing prisoners to seek DNA testing under §
1983 was a procedural loophole necessary only because of the way
habeas corpus claims in this context are foreclosed. While providing
this avenue to prisoners may signal the Court’s increased recognition
of modern DNA testing’s probative value, it is also evidence of the
Court’s failure to change its habeas corpus jurisprudence
accordingly.
When objective, scientific proof is readily available, no justification
exists to support a court’s refusal to order a test that could
conclusively establish innocence or guilt. The Supreme Court should
recognize that access to post-conviction DNA testing is not another
“bite at the apple” but rather an extraordinary opportunity to prove
actual innocence.

83. See id. at 1691–92 (finding that no one has been exonerated by postconviction DNA under an actual innocence claim during appeals before acquiring
DNA testing because Herrera only established a hypothetical claim with an
extraordinarily high burden); see also Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 126 (3d Cir.
2007) (holding that the Herrera standard was not met).
84. See Garrett, supra note 53, at 2932 n.103 (noting that in eighty-eight percent
of cases resulting in exonerations the prosecutors consented to motions to vacate
convictions, and in eighty-two percent prosecutors allowed for DNA testing (citation
omitted)).
85. See supra notes 80–84 and accompanying text.

